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Abstract 
 With the proliferation of the special sciences, sciences which are not fundamental 
physics, the scientific community has discovered incredible complexity in even the simplest 
biological, meteorological, or psychological systems. The methods of the special sciences are 
often different from the controlled methods found in fundamental physics and the kinds of claims 
that can be made are often far more contingent then those made by physicists. This had led to 
much speculation about whether or not physics can serve as the foundational science, whether or 
not all of the other sciences are really just “special cases” of physics. Perhaps these disciplines 
cannot ever be understood in terms of physics; perhaps each special science’s subject matter and 
fundamental ontology cannot ever be understood in terms of the ontology of fundamental 
physics. This paper will argue for a method to show how the fundamental ontology of any 
special science can be related to the ontology of fundamental physics through carefully 
constructed bridge laws which allow one to state under what conditions something will satisfy a 
type from a special science given that it satisfies a type from fundamental physics. To do so we 
must argue for a method that would allow the construction of bridge laws which relate terms in 
any special science to those of fundamental physics. Someone would be able to start with the 
statements of fundamental physics, and with the addition of these bridge laws, be able to deduce 
the statements of any special science. Though these bridge laws have not been fully fleshed out 
by science, if they could be found it would mean that fundamental physics can reduce any 
special science.  
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It is considered a great triumph of science that as time goes on and our theories become 
more powerful and more inclusive, many of the older or more specific theories are shown to be 
subsumed by the new or more inclusive ones. We often say that an old theory has been 
“reduced” to a new theory and that the older or specific theory can be derived, using suitable 
approximations or laws, from the newer or more inclusive one. Earnest Nagel settles on the 
following definition of intertheoretic reduction in the sciences: a reduction is an explanation with 
the form of an argument, so that every reduction can be construed as a set of statements from the 
new theory which, together with suitable approximations or bridge laws, entail the conclusion, 
which is the older theory. For terminology’s sake, we will refer to the new theory as the 
“reducing theory”, and the old one as the “reduced theory”.  The type of addition that must be 
added to the reducing theory, the approximations or bridge laws, to properly reduce a theory 
partition the intertheoretic reductions into two kinds: homogenous and inhomogeneous. I will 
briefly elaborate on these two kinds of intertheoretic reductions, focusing on the predicate 
relationship version for inhomogeneous reduction. With this in mind, I will argue that it is 
possible, using empirically motivated bridge laws, to show that the extensions of the predicates 
of a reduced theory are subclasses of extensions of the predicates of the reducing theory. By 
constructing a transitive subclass chain, the extensions of the predicates of the special sciences 
can be shown, by many iterations of this process, to be subclasses of the extensions of the 
predicates of fundamental physics. Should we be able to construct such a chain, one can use the 
bridge laws that allowed the construction of the chain to create a final biconditional bridge law 
for use in the intertheoretic reduction. The premises will be the statements of fundamental 
physics and will include the bridge laws, and the conclusion will be the statements of any special 
science. 
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Preliminaries 
 A homogenous reduction is one in which the theoretical terms of the reduced theory are 
present in the premises or can be defined explicitly only using terms from the reducing theory. 
One example of this is the reduction of Galileo’s law for free falling bodies by Newtonian 
mechanics. In this example, the premises of the intertheoretic reduction will come from 
Newtonian mechanics. These will be things like mathematical statements and terms that 
represent fundamental properties, such as time, distance, mass, and so on. Now, we see that if we 
look at the properties that are fundamental in Galilean mechanics, i.e., make up the ontology of 
Galilean mechanics, we will find that all of them are also present in Newtonian mechanics. So, 
we find that we needn’t introduce any sort of definition relating terms in Newtonian mechanics 
to terms in Galilean mechanics. Once we have the mathematical and terminological tools from 
Newtonian mechanics, we need only add an approximation to the set of premises, such as 
“ignore the small gravitational variance from the top of the fall to the bottom”, and we can arrive 
at Galileo’s mathematical formulation of free fall. In this way, homogenous intertheoretic 
reductions are, according to Nagel, easier and the argumentative form is more obvious. 
 However, there are some objections to this type of reduction. One such objection arises in 
the use of approximations. If we require an approximation that is not true (such as there being no 
variance between the gravity at the top and the bottom of a fall on Earth) in order to derive a 
reduced theory, then shouldn’t we simply say that the reduced theory has been replaced by the 
reducing theory? Well, it is commonly understood that a reducing theory is more comprehensive 
in its applicability and generality than the reduced theory, and furthermore that the reduced 
theory is but a special case of a reducing theory. When we increase the generality of a theory, it 
will hopefully be applicable to many different and perhaps not obviously related domains of 
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application than its predecessor. For example, if Newtonian mechanics is the successor to 
Galilean mechanics, then we should expect that Newtonian mechanics can be applied to more 
situations than Galilean mechanics. In fact, that is the case. Newtonian mechanics can be applied 
to celestial as well as terrestrial mechanics, whereas Galilean mechanics can only be applied to 
terrestrial mechanics. However, if we wish to increase the scope of a theory so that we may 
apply the new theory to different domains of application, we must recognize that the conditions 
that influence how and why we apply the theory to any specific problem in these separate 
domains are very different. These differences affect how we will apply the theory and the 
assumptions that might be made for various reasons, such as to make the math easier or because 
we only need limited accuracy. These assumptions are the approximations and/or simplifications 
that if added to the reducing theory allows the derivation of the reduced theory. Although the 
reduced theory is strictly speaking “wrong”, it follows from the reducing theory with the added 
approximations that are commonly employed to use the reducing theory effectively. Essentially, 
scientists do this each and every time they switch domains of application from a more general 
domain to a more specific or limited case. It just so happens that some of these approximations, 
when applied to the reducing theory, give us earlier, simpler theories that we already knew about 
and named, as is the case with Newtonian and Galilean mechanics. Galilean mechanics is often 
used in terrestrial applications when the accuracy needed is less than what one would get when 
using Newtonian mechanics. The math is simpler in Galilean mechanics as well. 
If someone never knew the name “Galilean mechanics” but was using Newtonian 
mechanics to calculate the fall time on Earth for an object to within a seconds accuracy, they 
would probably, to make their calculations simpler, assume that there is no gravitational variance 
from the top to the bottom of the fall. Some terms would be disregarded for having too little 
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influence on the accuracy, and it is likely that one would not even need to use anything more 
than grade school algebra, as opposed to a more advanced and cumbersome math, such as 
calculus. The equations that would be written on the page once they made this assumption would 
resemble those of Galilean mechanics. If later on he wished to calculate the fall time to within a 
millionth of a second, he might disregard the assumption that he made earlier. However, we 
wouldn’t say that the equations that he had written down before were “replaced” by the new 
ones. We would probably say that the first equations were adequate in a limited case, such as 
when the accuracy needed was less, and they were subsumed under the newest equations. This is 
how one switches between Galilean and Newtonian mechanics, and in fact, any pair of reduced 
and reducing theories that meet the above criteria for homogenous reductions. So in this way, 
one can still say that the reduced theory follows from the reducing theory so long as we have 
suitable approximations and/or simplifications.  
 The second type of reduction is an inhomogeneous reduction. This is a reduction in 
which at least one fundamental term in the conclusion neither occurs in the reducing theory nor 
is explicitly definable by those that do occur in them. An example of this is the reduction of 
Classical Thermodynamics (CT) to the Kinetic Theory of Gases. When one explores the terms 
used in CT, they would find fundamental terms such as “heat” or “entropy”. Those terms are not 
found in the Kinetic Theory of Gases (KTG). This lack of agreement between the theoretical 
terms of the two theories under consideration makes a homogenous reduction impossible. For 
this kind of intertheoretic reduction, Nagel discusses three broad types; the instrumentalist 
analysis, predicate relationship, and the replacement view. The instrumentalist view roughly 
corresponds to instrumentalism in the philosophy of science. These types of reductions are ones 
that are instrumentally useful for us. They might reduce or unify theories independent of whether 
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or not there actually exists a physically true reductive or unification relationship between them. 
The replacement view is just about what it sounds like. Those who expound it, like Feyerabend, 
would argue the lack of equivalence of the fundamental ontology of two theories (as is the case 
with CT and KTG) warrants a complete replacement of the reduced theory by the reducing 
theory. Of these, the only one that will be focused on as a candidate for total reduction of the 
special sciences to physics will be the predicate relationship version.  
As stated earlier, Nagel takes the form of intertheoretic reduction to be that of an 
argument. Thus, in an inhomogeneous reduction, the conclusion (which is the reduced theory) 
will have terms that do not appear in the premises (the reducing theory) unless there is a way to 
relate the terms of the reducing theory to those of the reduced theory. What is needed is a “bridge 
law/s”. These bridge laws are statements which relate the terms in the reduced theory to the 
terms in the reducing theory. Consider the following example. “Heat” does not occur in the 
KTG, so we must formulate a bridge law that connects some terms in the KTG to “heat”. The 
one that is used is (roughly) “Heat is the total kinetic energy of the constituent particles”. These 
bridge laws allow us to have the terms of the reduced theory relate to the terms in the reducing 
theory. The statement “heat is the total kinetic energy of the constituent particles” is an 
empirically motivated terminological bridge between the terms “heat” and the fundamental terms 
in the KTG which include “kinetic energy”.  In this way, if one takes the statements of the KTG 
as the premises, and introduces the proposed bridge law above, then one can deduce the 
statements of CT that contain the term “heat”. This intertheoretic reduction has the form of an 
argument and can in principle be done for each term that occurs in CT but not in the KTG. 
However, we should note that the bridge law is not explicitly defining “heat” in terms of 
kinetic energy of the constituent molecules in the same way that, for example, velocity is defined 
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as the change in distance with respect to time; for if it was, then we would get along just as fine 
without “heat”. We could eliminate it on purely logical grounds, since if A is explicitly defined 
in terms of B, then we can simply replace A with B, and no meaning or usefulness is lost (albeit 
the result might be more cumbersome). The problem is that “heat” was understood and used to 
make predictions well in advance of the bridge law stated above. The branch of CT makes no use 
of the term “kinetic energy” in its ontology. “Heat” is a basic term that stands alone and without 
reference to kinetic energy in CT, and CT can be used to make predictions, build machines, and 
the like just as well if we never knew the empirical connection relating “heat” to terms of the 
KTG. Thus, no amount of logical analysis can make sense of heat purely in terms of the kinetic 
energy of the constituent particles in a CT setting. In general, bridge laws are just that, empirical 
hypothesis relating terms in one theory to another that are made after the ontology of two 
theories has been developed. 
However, one should ask about the structure and function of these bridge laws if they are 
not explicit definitions. There are two proposals advanced by Nagel as to how a bridge law 
functions; bridge laws either increase the class of entities or situations that satisfy a predicate 
from the reducing theory to include those entities or situations that satisfy a predicate from the 
reduced theory, or the bridge laws claim that the extensions of two predicates, one in the 
reducing theory and one in the reduced theory, are the same. This second type of bridge law is 
biconditional.   
Bridge laws of the first type are those that broaden the class of entities or situations that 
satisfy a given predicate from the reducing theory to include those situations or entities that 
satisfy a predicate from the reduced theory. Every fundamental predicate used in a scientific 
theory refers to a class of objects or situations that satisfy a fundamental or natural type in that 
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science. A fundamental type of a science is a descriptive property that an object or situation 
possesses that is part of the ontology of that science. Predicates are used to refer to those types. 
For example, I might say that “mass” is a fundamental type in Newtonian Mechanics. Then the 
predicate “massive” will refer to those objects that satisfy the type “mass”, i.e. the things in the 
universe that have mass. An instantiation of some type will be an x that satisfies that type. So if x 
has mass then x is an instantiation of “mass”; x will also satisfy the predicate “massive”. 
The predicate “viscous” refers to the property of being thick, sticky, and to be of a 
consistency that is between that of a liquid and solid. The extension of any predicate is the class 
of entities or situations that satisfy that predicate. Thus, the extension of the predicate “viscous” 
is exactly the class whose members are viscous. However, molecular theory explains viscosity in 
terms of the frictional forces between layers of the constituent particles. The statement that a 
liquid is viscous and the statement that there are frictional forces between layers of particles for 
the given object are certainly not the same, they have different meanings, but with the bridge law 
stating that viscosity is merely a consequence of frictional forces between the layers of particles 
of the liquid in question, the predicate “viscous” now denotes a class of objects that is a subclass 
of those entities that have frictional forces between the layers of constituent particles. Here I am 
using “subclass” to mean: A is a sub-class of B if all members of A are members of B. The class 
of things that satisfy the predicate “have frictional forces between its constituent layers of 
particles” (F) has been extended by the proposed bridge law from molecular theory to include the 
members of the class of entities that satisfy the predicate “viscous”. We should note here that it is 
not to say that we have equivocated two or more classes of objects with the extension of 
“viscous”. As in, it is perfectly possible that an entity belongs to the extension of the predicate F 
but not belong to the extension of the predicate “viscous”. An example of this is Graphite. It 
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exists as a series of layers of carbon lattices of different arrangements. These layers interact with 
each other to give Graphite all kinds of properties that one would not use when referring to a 
liquid because Graphite is not a liquid. So, a sample of Graphite satisfies the predicate F but not 
the predicate “viscous”. However, every member of the extension of the predicate “viscous” will 
belong to the extension of the predicate F. We now see that the bridge law that relates “viscous” 
with F has increased the size of the extension of the predicate F to include the members of 
extension of the predicate “viscous”, but not the other way around. Though it might have always 
been the case that viscous things are viscous because of the frictional forces between layers of 
the particles, it is an empirical claim that that the property “viscous” arises from those frictional 
forces. Thus, before that empirical connection was discovered, someone who uses the predicate F 
to describe an object (or class of objects) will not be aware that they are also potentially referring 
to viscous objects. Through empirical inquiry, we now believe that the extension of F also 
contains all the members of the extension of “viscous”. 
Correspondences of the second kind establish the equivalence of the extensions of two or 
more predicates. They allow us to say that the class of objects that satisfy predicate A is the same 
class that satisfies predicate B. Here we are using equivalence between classes to mean having 
the same members. So for example, the bridge law stating that water freezing is identical to the 
water’s molecules slowing down and settling into a lattice formation under standard temperature 
and pressure (STP) conditions would equate the extensions of the predicates “water freezing” 
and “the molecules slowing down and settling into a lattice formation under STP”. In this case, 
the instances in which water would freeze are the exact same as the instances in which the 
molecules that comprise that sample of water slow down and align into a stable lattice under STP 
conditions. Thus, with the bridge law stated above, the classes of instances that satisfy each 
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predicate are the same. We should be careful here to note that a bridge law of this type does not 
claim that the meanings of the predicates in question are the same, but only that the extensions of 
those predicates have the same members. So, for example, the predicates “creature with a heart” 
and “creature with a kidney” do not mean the same thing. We might use them in different 
contexts and it seems reasonable that the terms cannot be interchanged without some loss of 
understanding. However, with our modern biology we now understand that these properties 
appear together. Any creature which satisfies one predicate will satisfy the other. The extensions 
of the two predicates are the same even though their meaning is not. In a similar fashion with 
“water freezing” and “molecules slowing…”, the two do not have the same meaning and so 
cannot be interchanged without confusion, but their extensions have the same members and with 
the bridge law relating the two the predicates denote the same class of objects. Bridge laws of the 
second type function in this way, to equate the extensions of two predicates, not their meanings. 
Part I 
It is the intertheoretic reduction that has the form of an inhomogeneous reduction that 
will allow each special science to be reduced to fundamental physics. If we are looking for 
prediction in the special sciences (SS) starting from fundamental physics (FP) and a sufficient 
computational tool, I do not think that is realistic. However, we can reduce all SS theories to FP 
by embedding each SS predicate in a FP predicate through a series of intermediate steps in a 
Russian Nesting Doll fashion. A predicate A is said to be embedded in another predicate B when 
the extension of A is a subclass of the extension of the predicate B. So, in the example with the 
predicates “viscous” and F, the extension of “viscous” was posited to be a subclass of the 
extension of F by the stated bridge law from molecular theory. The predicate “viscous” was 
therefore embedded in the predicate F. The nesting doll attempt to embed all SS predicates into 
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FP predicates will be made possible by taking advantage of the transitivity of the subclass 
relation. It is not hard to check that the subclass relation defined above is in fact transitive and I 
will leave that to the reader.1 
Now, the program of reducing all of the SS to FP will involve finding bridge laws 
through mathematical and/or experimental inquiries between theoretical frameworks of the SS 
which takes the theoretical predicates of a more specific SS and embeds those predicates in 
predicates from a more general SS. We can then repeat the process until we arrive at the 
predicates of FP. By the transitivity of the subclass relation, we can conclude than any predicate 
member of the chain is embedded in the predicates of FP. An example of this is the following. 
Consider the complex weather phenomena known as a “hurricane”. It is no secret what a 
hurricane looks and behaves like. There will often be deafening winds, rain, and their physical 
structure is similar to a spiral. However, the predicate “hurricane” is a theoretical term that is 
found in meteorology that characterizes a specific meteorological phenomena complete with its 
own mathematical, chemical, and physical characteristics that differentiate it from other similar 
phenomena (like a tropical storm). 
However, from the atmospheric sciences we are moving towards understanding what 
causes a hurricane and the conditions that are necessary (though we have not developed all of the 
sufficient conditions) for a hurricane to form. One necessary condition that must obtain for a 
hurricane to occur is that the area in which a hurricane forms must have particularly high 
humidity. Hurricanes do not form in dry environments. Though a specific humidity is no 
guarantee of a hurricane forming, a hurricane cannot form without high humidity. We see that 
humidity is a theoretical predicate of the atmospheric sciences. Our reduction proceeds as 
follows. So, one might have the list of predicates {Hi} that all describe the phenomena that must 
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obtain for a hurricane to happen. So, the instances in which a hurricane happen will also be 
instances in which I{Hi} also obtain, where I{Hi} is the intersection of the extensions of Hi, i.e., 
the instances in which each predicate of Hi obtains at the same time. Thus, any instance which is 
a member of I{Hi} will result in a hurricane. For each Hi, there was at least one instance of that 
predicate that is needed for a hurricane to happen (otherwise it wouldn’t be included in our list), 
so that each instance of a hurricane was also an instance of Hi. Thus, the extension of the 
predicate “hurricane” is a subclass of the extension of the predicate Hi for each Hi, and the 
predicate “hurricane” is thus embedded in each Hi. We can see that a bridge law relating 
“hurricane” to any Hi would now have extended the extensions of each Hi to include the 
instances of “hurricane”. So, the bridge law that relates the predicate “hurricane” to the 
predicates Hi is of the first type of bridge law described above.  
Now, we can then look at the predicates Hi and we should find that they are simpler 
predicates than “hurricane”. They could be things like “the humidity in the troposphere is higher 
than normal” (T). Now, we can look at the conditions that must obtain for the humidity of the 
troposphere to be higher than normal; call them Ti. Then the predicate T will be satisfied by the 
same instances that I{Ti} are satisfied. Thus the extension of T is a subclass of the extensions of 
each Ti (same argument above) and the predicate T is embedded in each Ti. We should ask at this 
point whether or not “hurricane” is also embedded in each Ti. As shown above, every instance of 
a hurricane is also an instance that satisfies each predicate Hi. So, if we consider just H0 to be 
“the humidity of the troposphere is higher than normal”, which we call T, we have just argued 
that T is embedded in each Ti. So, if each member of the extension of “hurricane” is also a 
member of the extension of T, and each member of T is also a member the extension of each Ti, 
then by the transitivity of the subclass relation, the extension of “hurricane” is also a subclass of 
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the extension of each Ti. The predicate “hurricane” is thus embedded in each predicate Ti. It is 
important to note that though we chose H0 to be T, it will make no difference which Hi we 
choose. We could have chosen the predicate which describes the wind shear of the given area 
instead. Similarly, if we wish to continue this pattern, we could choose some T0 and consider the 
predicates that must be satisfied for an instance of T0 to obtain. We can then show that the 
predicate “hurricane” is embedded in each of those as well. Now, the goal is to keep doing this 
until we get all the way through the atmospheric science’s predicates, to the predicates of 
chemistry, and finally to the predicates of physics. Since embedding predicates comes from the 
subclass relation applied to extensions of those predicates and the subclass relation is transitive, 
the extension of “hurricane” will also be a subclass of the extension of some FP predicate. Thus, 
the predicate “hurricane” is embedded in some FP predicate. 
Part II:  
Now, if we wish to construct an intertheoretic reduction that has the reducing theory as 
premises and, with the addition of bridge laws, concludes the reduced theory, we proceed 
backwards through the chain that I constructed. The bridge laws to be used in the argument will 
be the same bridge laws that allowed the predicates of the reduced theory to be embedded in the 
predicates of the reducing theory with a slight modification. They will function as a map between 
the fundamental types in the two theories as well as provide restrictions that must be in place for 
the extension of a reducing theory predicate to be culled (typically the specific instances under 
which one is considering the predicates from the reducing theory), leaving only the instances 
which satisfy a predicate of the reduced theory. This will allow the bridge laws to be 
biconditional and thus one-to-one from the predicate of the reduced theory to a restricted 
predicate from the reducing theory. The restriction will be required to preserve biconditionality 
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when one extension of a predicate ends up being a proper subclass of the extension of another 
predicate. Here A is a proper subclass of B if A is a subclass of B but B is not a subclass of A. 
For example, in the case where “viscous” was embedded in F, the bridge law that would show up 
in the argument would something like “viscosity is the frictional forces between constituent 
layers of particles in a liquid”. This bridge law will relate the terms from molecular theory to the 
term “viscous”, but will also restrict that relation to the cases that are relevant to the context in 
which one would use “viscous”, e.g., when discussing Fluid Dynamics. Since the predicate F has 
a larger extension than “viscous”, we need to strip away all of the extraneous cases that won’t be 
useful for Fluid Dynamics and destroy the biconditional (such as Graphite). In the paragraph 
where F and “viscous” were first discussed, we were only interested in finding a bridge law that 
related the term “viscous” to the terms of molecular theory for the purposes of constructing our 
subclass chain. The proposed bridge law only showed that the extension of “viscous” was a 
subclass of the extension of F, but to go to the other direction, to use the bridge law to go from F 
to “viscous” (for our reduction), we will need to specify the conditions under which the property 
viscous relates F, since their extensions are not the same.  
In the same vein, humidity and wind shear alone do not by themselves (along with the 
other, not discussed causes) give rise to a hurricane. There must be other restrictions for a 
hurricane to arise, such as specific numerical values for humidity and wind shear occurring 
together. However, this is a more complicated case since “hurricane” is embedded in more than 
one predicate, whereas “viscous” was only embedded in F. We must tread more carefully in such 
an example. The bridge laws that must be used to reduce Cyclonography (the study of 
hurricanes) to meteorology/atmospheric sciences will be conjunctive in nature. Since argued that 
“hurricane” is directly embedded in “wind shear” and “humidity” and so on, we will need a 
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bridge law for each of predicate. Each bridge law will still be biconditional but will have to 
mention each of the other predicates involved due to the complex nature of hurricanes. Each 
bridge law will be the same and will be conjunctive in nature, something along the lines of 
“hurricane is wind shear of such and such value, along with humidity of such and such value, 
along with …”. Due to this, our conjunctive bridge law gives rise to an interesting result. Since 
each bridge law that relates “hurricane” is the same for the predicates “wind shear”, “humidity”, 
and so on, and the bridge law mentions each of these predicates, each predicate will be restricted 
in the same way. So, the extensions of each restricted predicate will be the exact same. 
Furthermore, the extension of each restricted predicate will be exactly I{Hi}! This is exactly the 
result that we desired. It is likely that the reductions that occur between the higher sciences such 
as psychology, neuroscience, meteorology, and so on will have the same form. In fact, the simple 
case that we encountered between “viscous” and F will likely be in the minority. 
 Now, this is the most important part for our reduction of any SS to FP. We should 
hope that for each Hi there will be a bridge law relating it to some fundamental predicate of a 
reducing science such as Chemistry/Atmospheric Chemistry (in the case of humidity), or Fluid 
Dynamics (in the case of wind shear), and so on. For the sake of length I will merely suppose 
that these reductions are not as contentious since they involve simpler phenomena. So, we now 
have a biconditional bridge law between “hurricane” and “wind shear”. A reduction that relates 
“wind shear” to a predicate from a more fundamental SS will create a biconditional bridge law 
from “wind shear” to a fundamental predicate in that SS. However, biconditionals are themselves 
transitive and so there will be a biconditional bridge law from “hurricane” to that predicate from 
the next SS, it will be the conjunction of the bridge law from “hurricane” to “wind shear” and the 
bridge law from “wind shear” to the predicate from whatever SS we go to next. We can continue 
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this process until we have a biconditional bridge law from “hurricane” to some fundamental 
predicate from FP. With this bridge law we can construct the intertheoretic reduction from FP to 
Cyclonography.  
Part III 
 We have thus far been concerned with creating a method for constructing the reduction 
from FP to any SS. However, the main example of a hurricane, while interesting, is primarily not 
the example that must be dealt with when trying to make sense of reduction. The rest of the 
paper will focus on examples from Economics and Psychology/Neuroscience, and in particular, 
Jerry Fodor’s arguments against intertheoretic reduction. 
 Fodor believes that intertheoretic reduction is far too strong of a claim. He believes that 
what is usually happening is that those who believe that reduction can be done are often 
confusing type physicalism and token physicalism. He does not deny that every event is in fact a 
physical event. This is the claim of token physicalism, that every event that happens is a physical 
event. There are no “mental” events that are not physical for example. However, this is not the 
same as claiming that every fundamental type from a SS has a directly corresponding 
fundamental type from an ideally completed FP. This is the claim of type physicalism. To argue 
his point he focuses on the example of Gresham’s Law from Economics and various issues in 
psychology/neuroscience.  
 To start, he paints a somewhat different picture for an intertheoretic reduction (which we 
will soon show to have nearly the same structure as the one introduced in the introduction). He 
takes the form of an intertheoretic reduction to be:  
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(1) If S1x, then S2x 
(2a) S1x if and only if P1x 
(2b) S2x if and only if P2x 
(3) If P1x, then P2x 
Here line (1) is a lawful statement from a SS. Laws usually have the form “If x satisfies S1, 
then it will satisfy S2”. Line (3) is a law from FP, and lines (2a) and (2b) are bridge laws of the 
form “x satisfies Si if and only if x satisfies Pi”. Fodor then considers exactly how we should 
read the “if and only if” connective and decides on this following reading that is truest to the 
intentions of a reductivist. “Bridge laws thus state nomologically necessary contingent event 
identities.” With this understanding of a bridge law, he settles on the familiar belief of the 
reductivist, namely that “any prediction which follows from the laws of a special science and a 
statement of initial conditions will also follows from a theory which consists of fundamental 
physics and the bridge laws, together with the statement of initial conditions”. Now that the 
preliminary remarks are out of the way, we see the consequence of the last few lines. 
Reductivism is too strong of a claim because it claims that every fundamental type from a SS is, 
or is co-extensive with, a fundamental type from FP; where two (or more) predicates are “co-
extensive” if they apply to the same things.  
Part IIIi 
To argue against this point, Fodor gives the example of Gresham’s Law about monetary 
exchanges. Gresham’s Law states that “When a government overvalues one type of money and 
undervalues another, the undervalued money will leave the country or disappear from circulation 
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into hoards, while the overvalued money will flood into circulation”2. Fodor grants that any 
event which is a monetary exchange is in fact a physical event and is governed by the laws of 
physics, but believes that to give a description of Gresham’s Law in terms of physics, one would 
have to have a wildly long and convoluted disjunction of terms from physics to correspond to the 
types found in Gresham’s Law, owing to the multitude of methods of monetary exchanges 
(writing a check, a wire transfer, physical handing of money over, etc.), monetary systems 
(dollars, sea shells, etc.), along with whatever else must be in play for Gresham’s Law to be 
relevant. As in, if x were to satisfy “x is a monetary exchange”, then it must satisfy (according to 
Fodor’s reductionism) a predicate P from physics. However, this P would likely have to be of the 
form P1 v P2 v …Pn to account for the incredible generality of the predicate “monetary 
exchange” and the circumstances or instances to which to could be applied. How would one go 
about constructing such a disjunction of physical predicates? Are we really guaranteed that such 
a disjunction could even be constructed given what we know about the extreme contingency of 
money, monetary exchanges, and so on? Fodor admits that it might be possible that brute 
enumeration might be able to pull this off, but that it would take nothing short of brute 
enumeration to convince us that it were possible. That long disjunction would then have to be 
found as an antecedent or consequent of a conditional of the form of (3), otherwise it would not 
be a fundamental type from physics. What kind of law would use such a disjunction within 
physics as the antecedent or the consequent? If we cannot find one, then this disjunction is not a 
fundamental type and the reduction fails.  
Fodor does allow the transitivity of “if, then” and “If and only if”, but even if we could 
find a long chain of “if and only if” statements linking us from Gresham’s Law, all the way 
through the intermediary SS (such as psychology, neuroscience, etc.), the chain must terminate 
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in physics. The end predicate that anchors the chain must be from physics and would still, no 
matter the content of the other predicates from the other sciences used in the chain, likely need to 
be of the form P1 v P2 v …Pn to cover all monetary systems and exchanges. As in, the fact that 
there might be a transitive chain linking predicates through the SS does not diminish the type of 
predicate that must be found from physics to relate to “monetary exchange”. 
To deal with the Fodor’s example from economics we will first argue that it can be 
reduced to psychology. To do this we must consider the predicates “x is a monetary exchange” 
and “x is a money”, both of which are fundamental types in economics. Fodor brings up an 
interesting point when he talks about the myriad of things that can be money and the things that 
count as monetary exchanges. We should explore some of these criteria. For something to be 
money it must be valuable for some reason to someone. It also has to be barter-able; that is the 
whole point of money. In general we gather money so that we can trade it for something. To 
some people certain money might have a value other than its barter-ability. A king might wish to 
bathe in gold and so gathers gold for that purpose, but presumably most of the people who gather 
gold do so in the hopes of trading it to the king (or those acting on his behalf) for things that they 
want that are not gold. Money must also be valued by the person that you are bartering with. I 
cannot go to the local supermarket and trade seashells for bread. The store does not recognize 
seashells as currency because it does not value it. Similarly, someone might value musical talent, 
but I cannot give away some of my musical talent for bread either, even if the bread owner was 
willing to make the trade. The point of this analysis is to show that “money” cannot be 
understood without reference to a mental state, namely “valued”. However, the fact that some 
things are valued but cannot be used as money points to the extension of the predicate “x is a 
money” being merely a subclass of the predicate “x is valued”. This is very important for our 
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purposes because it means that the type “money” found in economics is intimately linked with 
the psychological state that is “value”. It is a psychological state that determines what we value 
and thus what can be money. I take it that this is not too controversial and so will move forward.  
Now that we have explored the ways in which the extensions of “x is a money” and “x is 
valued” relate, we can create the biconditional bridge law, complete with the initial conditions 
that map the restricted predicate “x is valued” in a one-to-one fashion onto “x is a money”. The 
bridge law will be the following: “x is money if and only if x is barter-able, valued by two or 
more people and…”. The “…” include the other conditions that delineate money from any 
particular valued thing. So with this bridge law we have established that the predicate “x is 
money” is co-extensive with the restricted predicate “x is valued”. Now, we can do the same 
thing with “x is a monetary exchange” by understanding that monetary exchanges are merely 
exchanges of certain valued things. Fodor believed that the multitude of types of money and 
types of monetary exchanges posed a problem for reduction, but if we merely recognize that they 
are indicative of a much more fundamental criteria, which we found to be “x is valued”, then we 
see that the multiplicity arises when one realizes the multitude of things that can be valued. 
Fodor worries that this multitude in things that can be money will not map in a one-to-one way 
with some P from FP and this multiplicity will show up as a disjunction of predicates at the level 
of FP. However, if every type of money maps into one type form psychology, namely “value” 
then the task becomes whether or not “value” maps into some P from FP. We have made the 
problem simpler (albeit by only a small amount). In this way we recognize that Gresham’s Law 
is merely making statements about how humans behave given changes in what they value. This 
appears to make it a claim from Behavioral Psychology, albeit on a scale this is unmanageable 
for the young science. It seems likely that one could do this for all of economics’ laws. 
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 Part IIIii 
Now that the task to show that economics can likely be reduced to economics, we can 
move on to more interesting and complicated tasks. The more complicated task is to show that 
psychology can be reduced by the method argued for here. 
To argue against for the impossibility of this task, Fodor claims that there is nothing but 
the grossest correspondence between psychological states and neurological states. Furthermore, 
it is possible that the more complex neurological systems found in humans arrive at the same 
psychological state by different neurological means than simpler organisms would use to arrive 
at the same psychological state. There might also be more than one way to arrive at a given 
psychological state even within the same neurological system. This would seem to be an issue if 
we wished to find a neurological natural kind that corresponds to a given psychological natural 
kind and vice versa. We would likely need to relate through a bridge law a given psychological 
state with another long disjunction of neurological states to account for all the neurological states 
between humans that give rise to the same psychological state, and this would be just the first 
step in the reduction of psychology to physics. If it is true that there is more than one 
neurological state that corresponds to a given psychological state, then it seems even more 
unlikely that one could construct the transitive chain of “if and only if” statements between 
natural kinds of psychology, neuroscience, and so on until we arrive at physics. We would arrive 
at the same problem that we found before with “x is money”; different psychological states all 
mapping onto different predicates from FP, giving rise to a disjunction of Pis which is not itself a 
natural kind in FP. If we then move beyond the bounds of human neurological structures the 
situation becomes more complex. We might have two or more creatures that feel pain even 
though they have very different neurological systems. So it would seem that in this case we 
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would have that Q (a psychological types) is so and so in a human, or it is so and so in an 
octopus, or it is so and so in an …This disjunction will certainly not be a natural kind from 
neuroscience. The existence of a sort of law linking “pain” and a neurological state which would 
allow one to reduce the psychological state of “pain” to a neurophysiological state seems 
increasingly implausible.  
The case of multiple neurological states corresponding to one psychological state can be 
handled in the following way. Let us suppose that for some type in psychology (a mental state), 
call it Q, there is the set of neurological types that we believe are in involved in that mental state, 
{Ni}. We must be careful to distinguish two different ways in which these Ni can relate to Q. 
There is the simpler case, in which some Ni, under certain initial conditions, will simply be Q. In 
this case we have that the extension of Q is a subclass of the extension of Ni, and with the bridge 
law that shows us under what conditions an instantiation of Ni results in Q, we can create a 
biconditional bridge law that includes those initial conditions which maps in a one-to-one 
fashion Q to a restricted Ni. This is the standard case that has been discussed at length. The more 
complicated case in one in which more than one Nj is involved in some instantiation of Q. This is 
rather like the “hurricane” case and will proceed the same way. Our bridge laws that relate each 
Nj to Q will have to restrict the extensions of each Nj in the same way so as to preserve the 
biconditional. Thus, under the bridge law applied to each Nj, the extension of each Nj will be 
exactly I{Nj}. Now, we have posited at least two cases in which more than neurological state 
gives rise to a psychological state. It can either be that Q relates to the restricted Ni 
biconditionally or that Q relates to I{Nj} biconditionally (or both). So, we see that the extension 
of Q is exactly the class of the restricted extension of Ni or I{Nj}, which we can write as 
U{Ni,I{Nj}}. This is the union of: the extensions of each Ni that we believe is involved in Q 
  22 
independently, and the intersection of each Nj that is involved in Q dependently. The question is 
whether or not this has actually gotten us anywhere. Well, we can then use the disjunction of the 
individual bridge laws that we found in each case above to create a biconditional bridge law that 
relates the extension of Q to the set U{Ni,I{Nj}}. We now have a one-to-one mapping from the 
extension of Q to a class whose members are instantiations of the Ni that we, in our present 
ignorance, think are involved in Q. However, this bridge law, though it could be incredibly long 
and cumbersome, will be a proper bridge law for the reduction of psychology by neuroscience. 
As in, if x is in U{Ni,I{Nj}}, then x will also be an instantiation of Q. The issue arises when we 
go the other way, from an instantiation of Q to an instantiation of some Ni. We will know which 
neurological types an instantiation of Q cannot be; it cannot be a type from neuroscience that is 
not represented in U{Ni,I{Nj}}, but we will not know exactly which Ni is being satisfied by x in 
general. This is a concession to our lack of information and it is hoped that with further time and 
inquiry this disjunctive bridge law will shrink until it is as precise as some of the other bridge 
laws that have been explored in this paper. 
The last case, where different neurological structures in different creatures can result in 
the same psychological state is actually very similar to the above problem and so the explanation 
will be brief. In this case our bridge laws must be equipped with the conditions in which a 
neurological type relates to a psychological type and they must also include which 
animal/neurological structure this particular bridge law will apply. A neuroscientist will no 
longer be able to speak in generalities, but will have to distinguish between neurological 
structures that are sufficiently different from each other. So, instead of merely Ni relating to Q 
through a bridge law, we will have to specify NHi to mean that we are talking about a 
neurological state in a human, which might be different in an octopus. No matter the animal, we 
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can construct the same kind of bridge law that we did in the preceding paragraph from Q to 
U{Ni,I{Nj}} for each Q that we find in that animal. Only now we will actually be talking about 
how QH relates through a bridge law to U{NHi,I{NHi}}, if we are discussing human neuroscience 
and psychology. Now, as neuroscience progresses I believe that we will find that many of these 
neurological states are more similar than we though and that we will find similar or the same 
neurological states in any given creature giving rise to the same psychological state, though this 
cannot be empirically supported at this time.  
Concluding Remarks 
So have we actually answered the objections that are commonly raised by those who 
believe that a reduction cannot be done? Yes and no. Recall that in the opening paragraph we 
defined a reduction to be an argument where the premises are statements from the new or more 
inclusive theory, along with bridge laws, which allows us to conclude statements from the older 
or less inclusive theory. This appears to be unidirectional. Physics would reduce chemistry; 
Newtonian Mechanics would reduce Galilean Mechanics, and so on, but not the other way 
around. However, in creating the structure that we have in this paper we actually see that this 
method can be used to reduce FP by psychology, though with some restriction. It is reasonable to 
think that an instantiation of a predicate from FP might not result in an instantiation of a 
predicate from psychology; surely before the evolution of consciousness we should never expect 
that anything could ever be an instantiation of a predicate from psychology even though plenty 
of things are instantiating predicates from FP. This method captures our intuitive understanding 
of reduction, namely that every instantiation of a predicate from a SS is an instantiation of a 
predicate from FP, and that with the proper initial conditions, a specific instantiation of a 
predicate from FP will result in an instantiation of a predicate from some SS. To give an example 
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of how this works, let us return to the example of Q, the type from psychology. The biconditional 
chain of bridge laws that will relate Q to a type from FP, call it P, will be a conjunction of the 
biconditional bridge laws that pass through each of the SS from psychology to FP. So, the first 
step will be the bridge law that we found to relate the extension of Q to U{Ni,I{Nj}}, and the 
next conjunct will be the bridge law that relates whatever Ni that x (in the extension of Q) 
satisfied to some type from Neurochemistry/Neurobiology. The next conjunct will be the bridge 
law that relates that type from Neurochemistry/Neurobiology to a type from Biology, and so on. 
This final bridge law will be biconditional, so that any x which is in the extension of Q will be 
found in the extension of some P in FP. Also, any x in the extension of P, should it satisfy each 
of the conditions in the conjunctive bridge law, will also be found in the extension of Q. So we 
have a bridge law that is a one-to-one mapping from Q to a subclass of the extension of P. This is 
exactly what we expect. Some instantiations of P will never result in an instantiation of Q, but all 
instantiations of Q will result in an instantiation of P. Now, if we created this long bridge law for 
each Qi that is a type in psychology, then we would have all of the bridge laws that one would 
need to make the reduction from FP to Psychology. More generally, if such a bridge law could 
be constructed it would mean that each fundamental type in a SS is co-extensive with a restricted 
fundamental type from FP. 
How does this relate to the structure of an intertheoretic reduction outlined at the 
beginning of Part IIIi? Well, that structure seemed to be bi-directional, so that Psychology should 
reduce FP and FP should reduce Psychology. With the bridge law stated above, we do not 
necessarily get this, but we get something close. We can reduce Psychology by FP, we did this 
just above, but we can also reduce FP by Psychology for only a select few entities or situations; 
namely the entities that would be in the extension of some Pi and satisfy each of the conditions 
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present in the conjunctive bridge laws that relate Qi to Pi. So, if we started with the statements of 
psychology and wished to add in each of the bridge laws that we spent so much time 
constructing, we actually could, but the entire reduction would only be true for some 
instantiations of Pi. This is both a concession to Fodor and a statement that the method of 
intertheoretic reduction developed in this paper more closely captures our intuitions on the 
subject; namely that each thing that satisfies a type from psychology will satisfy a type from FP, 
but that not all things that satisfy a type from FP will ultimately satisfy a type from psychology. 
Similar arguments can in principle be made for any SS. 
 The goal has hopefully been reached. Starting from Nagel’s definition of an 
intertheoretic reduction, we defined and explored the two different types, homogenous and 
inhomogenous. The difficulties of the inhomogenous reduction forced us to consider in what 
ways that fundamental predicates of an older or more specific SS relate to those from a newer or 
more inclusive SS. In doing so, we discovered that the bridge laws could be used to relate the 
extensions of one predicate to another other through the subclass relation. Taking this idea 
further, we argued that any fundamental predicate from a SS would end up being embedded in a 
predicate from FP by taking advantage of the transitivity of the subclass relation. Once this 
transitive chain of subclasses is established we could create a bridge law that relates any 
predicate from a SS to a predicate from FP by creating a large conjunctive bridge law whose 
conjuncts are each bridge law used to create the subclass chain from the extension of that 
predicate from the SS to the predicate from FP. So long as we included the initial conditions that 
determine the restrictions placed on each of the predicates that were being embedded in so that 
their extension exactly matched the predicate that was being embedded in them, this bridge law 
would be biconditional. With these biconditional bridge laws for each fundamental predicate 
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from a SS to a fundamental predicate from FP, we could start with the statements of FP and add 
in the bridge laws to create an argument that would yield the statements of any SS. Thus, if such 
a structure could be made, which rests on increased empirical investigation, that structure can be 
used to show that FP reduces any SS. 
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Notes: 
1. I should also point out that the bridge laws that state the identity of two extensions of 
predicates satisfy the subclass relation because any class is a subclass of itself (i.e., the 
subclass relation is reflexive). The reflexivity of the subclass relation will be important 
for bridge laws that assert the identity of the extension of two or more SS predicates. This 
will allow us to continue linking the extensions of SS predicates in the transitive subclass 
chain even if we have two extensions that are found to be the same through empirical 
enquiry.  
2. Rothbard, Murray, Commodity Money in Colonial America, LewRockwell.com 
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